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INDIA‟S ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY AND 





 For developing countries, the concept of diversity holds great 
promises not least because of the protection it promises for the fast 
depleting natural resources leading to catastrophic effect on the 
environment. The concept of diversity also holds great promises from a 
trade perspective. In reality, appropriate protection of diversity can be the 
solution to balance the effects of the trade regime to achieve sustainable 
development. The term sustainable development, as opposed to rapid 
pockets of development, embodies great promises for the socio-political 
framework in poorer nations, apart from the obvious benefit of 
sustainability. In fact, sustainable development, if it ensues, would complete 
the trade regime‘s agenda by supplying the missing piece of the puzzle. 
From a practical standpoint, at the very basic level, sustainable development 
promises a level of inclusiveness, which can facilitate addressing broader 
national issues.  
Similarly, sustainable development is compatible with the larger 
trade agenda by promising to include newer forms of trading capital – such 
as biodiversity for biotechnology or traditional knowledge for 
pharmaceutical innovation - hitherto excluded from the trade regime. The 
trade regime which traditionally deals with what is typically western 
properties like goods, services, patents and investments, can, in turn, 
benefit from the dynamism resulting from say, trade in biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge. This paper will discuss the issues that impact 
biodiversity protection as a result of its interaction with the trade regime. 
Particularly, this paper will focus on India and the issues it faces from 
embracing the biodiversity and the trade regime.  
II. Convention on Biological Diversity 
 Much has been written about the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Hence, after providing a short introduction to the Convention, 
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this essay will concentrate on aspects of Convention that are important for 
developing countries to embrace, not just in principle but in practice.  
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), signed at the 
United Nation‘s Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, 
came into force on December 29, 1993 1  with the primary agenda of 
creating an international framework to beneficially exploit and conserve 
biodiversity.2At the time of its conception, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity was meant to complement the UN‘s efforts in establishing a 
Conference on Environment and Development (hereinafter ―Rio 
Summit‖), which addressed broadly the role of environment, climate, and 
indigenous communities.3 The CBD was conceived as a global agreement 
to address all aspects of biological diversity.4 
Broadly, the CBD streamlined the use of access and sharing of 
genetic resources to achieve three important objectives: first, conserving 
biological diversity; second, promoting appropriate access for the 
sustainable use of biodiversity components; and third, sharing benefits 
from biodiversity resources in exchange for transfer of technology.5 The 
objectives of the Convention are set in the background of the principle of 
―fair and equitable sharing‖ of the benefits from genetic resources, which 
principle is considered the crux for enabling transfer of technology. 6 
Overall, the CBD‘s objective is to promote the use of biodiversity resources 
toward sustainable development. The term biologicaldiversity encompasses 
plants, animals, and microorganisms and their relationship to the overall 
ecosystems, including the people on earth and the genetic resource in the 
ecosystem.7 The CBD‘s distinguishing feature is its ability to serve as a 
                                                          
1  Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. Biodiv.No.92-7807, 31 
I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter ―CBD‖], also available at http://www.biodiv.org. 
2  Id. 
3  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declarationon 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted 
in 31 I.L.M. 87 (1992) [hereinafter ―Rio Declaration‖], Chapter 26, Agenda 21;see also 
CBD, supra note 1.  
4  Sustaining Life on Earth: How the Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and 
Human Well-Being (May 19, 2005), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/ 
publications/guide.asp?id=action. 
5  CBD, supra note 1, Art. 1. 
6   Id. 
7  Id. 
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conduit to enable sustainability and thus, it signifies a relative break from 
the compulsive and one-dimensional developmental perspectives promoted 
by the trade and intellectual property (IP) agenda.8 
With the above as the background, the following narrative 
highlights how the objectives are reflected in the Convention.  
2.1  CONSERVATION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
Conservation remains the central objectives of the CBD – the main 
emphasis is to prevent the loss of biodiversity due to bioprospecting and to 
ensure sustainable use of the diversity materials, each of which is discussed 
below.  
Conservation & Sustainable Use: Conservation is the central tenet 
around which the CBD is structured. That conservation is uniformly 
important for all countries that seem to lose biodiversity materials due to 
lack of adequate programs to conserve existing resources is not lost on the 
Convention. Consequently, with the objective of furthering the idea of 
conserving biodiversity materials, Article 8(g) of the CBD,9 discusses in situ 
conservation and mandates that countries manage risks that are likely to 
adversely impact the environment.10 That is, countries should ―[e]stablish or 
maintain the means to regulate, manage or control risks from 
biotechnology likely to adversely impact the environment.‖11 
Tied closely with the concept of conservation is the requirement of 
sustainable use of biodiversity materials. The underlying objective is that 
conservation does not take away the right to use biodiversity. Nevertheless, 
such use should not result in depletion of the biodiversity materials. Thus, 
Article 3 of the CBD affirms the sovereign right of states to exploit 
resources ―pursuant to their own environmental policies.‖ 12 It allows 
governments to take stock of the biological diversity materials and 
determine the best mechanism to ensure that it is not depleted. Article 
                                                          
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Id., Art.8(g). 
11  Id., Art.8(g). 
12  Id., Art. 3. 
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15(1) reflects this sentiment by emphasizing the ―sovereign rights of States 
over their natural resources.‖13 
However, although governments may impose restrictions on access 
to genetic resources using national legislation, arguably the Convention 
skews towards allowing access. For instance, Article 15(2) specifies that 
national legislation shall not run counter to the objectives of the 
Convention.14 One of the objectives of the Convention, outlined in Article 
1, is to allow ―appropriate‖ access to genetic resources.15 In effect, Articles 
15(1) and (2), when read in conjunction with Article 1, advocate 
appropriate restrictions in a manner not stifling access to genetic resources. 
In all, under the CBD, member states‘ have rights to limit and dictate the 
manner and mechanism of allowing access. The Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, a Commission that means to integrate IP rights and 
developmental policies, reflects this sentiment and notes that: 
. . . care will be necessary to ensure that legislation and practices that seek to 
give effect to the CBD do not in fact unnecessarily restrict or discourage the 
legitimate use of genetic resources, whether with a view to commercialization or 
in terms of scientific research. There is some evidence that the tightening of 
restrictions in some countries has hindered the access of biologists studying 
genetic resources.16 
Importantly, while the CBD‘s legislative objective is to preserve 
sovereign rights over genetic resources, the criticism remains that 
operationally those rights are limited by the overall objective of granting 
access to genetic resources. However, it is important to recognize that 
development by definition will result in some use of biological diversity. 
Perhaps, it is in recognition of this that the Convention has attempted to 
balance use with sustainability. Consequently, countries cannot refuse 
access but they can carefully impose restrictions to ensure preservation of 
biodiversity and local communities. Such restrictions can include a 
mandatory obligation to disclose what is accessed, consent of the 
                                                          
13  Id. Art.15(1). 
14  Id. Art.15 (1) and (2). 
15  Id., Art. 1. 
16  Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating IP Rights & 
Development Policy, 83–84, September (2002) [hereinafter ―CIPR Report‖], available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm. 
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indigenous people, disclosure of terms with the indigenous people, 
limitation of area that can be used for prospecting, restrictions over use of 
area, and other such obligations.  
The Nagoya Protocol 17  has further elaborated on the sovereign 
rights over the resources as well as the competing interests in generating fair 
and equitable sharing by emphasizing in Article 3 that each signatory party 
can take appropriate measures to ensure benefit sharing and utilization of 
traditional knowledge resources. Importantly, Article 3(4) of the Protocol 
alludes to monetary as well as non-monetary benefits that countries can 
negotiate as part of the deal. Some of these can be used to work around 
impediments imposed by the TRIPS agreement.18 That is, Annex 2 outlines 
several mechanisms whereby the holder of the genetic resources can 
collaborate and work with the bioprospector. It provides for non-monetary 
benefits including agreements that resemble local manufacturing 
requirements (in exchange for transfer of diversity assets). When IP assets 
are involved, countries should carefully tailor them to ensure that they fall 
within the flexibilities outlined under the TRIPS agreement. 
2.2  APPROPRIATE ACCESS TO BIODIVERSITY MATERIALS 
One of the foremost objectives of the CBD is to preserve sovereign 
rights over genetic resources. However, granting access to genetic resources 
remains an equally important aspect of the Convention. The effect of this is 
that while countries cannot refuse access, they can carefully impose 
restrictions to ensure preservation of biodiversity and local communities. 
Such restrictions can include a mandatory obligation to disclose what is 
accessed, consent of the indigenous people, disclosure of terms with the 
indigenous people, limitation of area that can be used for prospecting, 
restrictions over use of area, and other such obligations. One such 
important formality to access genetic resources is to obtain the ―prior 
                                                          
17   Article 6, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Oct. 2010), 
available at http://www.cbd.int (last visited July 12, 2011). 
18  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,  Annex 1C, vol. 
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], reprinted in World Trade Organization, 
The Results Of The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 365 (1995), 
[hereinafter, TRIPS]. 
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informed consent‖ of the holder. Articles 8(j) and 15(5) treat the 
community consent requirement as a precondition to accessing biodiversity 
assets.19 But, the CBD does not define the term ―prior informed consent.‖ 
Although the lack of definition allows countries to determine the type, 
extent, and nature of information required to provide consent, it also leaves 
a lot of scope for misuse. For instance, generally, in order for consent to be 
informed, resource holders should have adequate knowledge of the proposed 
use and future financial potential of the resources they would be sharing. 
Such information is a prerequisite for the ad idem required to create a proper 
―mutual agreement.‖ In practice, the degree of information to be imparted 
tends to vary, depending on the bio–prospector, the holder, and the genetic 
material in question. 20  This, however, provides an opportunity for 
information to be withheld, depending on the level of awareness of the 
indigenous people. 
The potential for misuse is tremendous given the inequality in 
bargaining capacity and sophistication of the parties. The nature of 
information qualifying the consent as ―informed,‖ the constituents of 
adequacy of the consent, and the time frame within which the information 
should be shared are left to the member state to legislate upon depending 
on the extent of education or knowledge of the community and such other 
considerations. With a view to addressing this deficiency, the Bonn 
Guidelines suggested measures that countries can adopt, such as 
mechanisms that encourage disclosure of information to holders and 
measures that prevent misuse of the genetic resources.21 Similarly, the more 
recent Nagoya Protocol, discussed later in the paper, provides norms that 
member states can adopt to ensure ―legal certainty, clarity and 
transparency‖ in their domestic legislation. 22  The protocol suggests that 
                                                          
19  CBD, supra note 1, Art. 8(j) and 15(5). 
20  See generally Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the 
Relationship between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 ELR 10625, 10631 
(2001). 
21  Article 16(d), Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of Their Utilization, Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/24 (Apr. 2002), available at 
http:// www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?m=cop-06&d=24. 
22  Article 6, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Oct. 2010), 
available at http://www.cbd.int (last visited July 12, 2011). 
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members establish rules to: (1) streamline access, (b) standardize the 
process of obtaining prior informed consent, (3) create rules that can allow 
decisions to be rendered in the event of a dispute, and (4) establish terms 
relating to benefit sharing and use by third parties, including in relation to 
intellectual property rights. 23  The Nagoya Protocol gives the impression 
that related issues that may arise in this regard should be dealt with by 
individual nations.24 Article 7 of the Protocol provides: ―[I]n accordance 
with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, with the 
aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
that is held by indigenous and local communities is accessed with the prior 
and informed consent or approval‖ 25  Thus, the Protocol envisages or 
guides member states to establish rules that provide for a streamlined 
application procedure that establishes a fair, non-arbitrary mechanism 
through a national authority and within a reasonable period of time. Such 
procedure suggests not only a clear evidence of consent but also 
notification to a national established clearing house of the consent to access 
the information. Thus, a dispute settlement clause, a separate clause on 
benefit sharing and intellectual property rights, including future assignment 
or division of rights are all required to be part of the consent document.  
The issue of prior informed consent has presented many challenges 
to the member states. For instance, questions like whether the holders of 
indigenous knowledge retain the right to refuse consent after knowing the 
―full and fair‖ circumstances of the case remains unclear and unanswered. 
Also, what happens in circumstances where an access agreement is violated 
after the genetic resource has been transferred? The only possible remedy 
under these circumstances is to invalidate the agreement for breach- but, 
the question was whether that would violate the access commitment under 
the CBD.26 Also, considering that the genetic material and knowledge have 
already been transferred, invalidating the agreement is neither a deterrent to 
the bioprospector nor a protective mechanism to indigenous societies. Post 
the Nagoya Protocol, individual member have clearer guidelines to 
determine these questions. They can fall within the larger ambit of ―terms 
on changes of intent.‖27Alternately, some of these issues can also fall within 
                                                          
23   Id. 
24  See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 21.  
25  Id. Art. 7. 
26  See CIPR Report, supra note 17, at 91. 
27  Id. 
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the scope of special considerations detailed under Article 8 of the Protocol 
which provides adequate leeway for countries to take emergency, public 
interest considerations including impact on food and agriculture. Article 10 
encourages parties to determine modalities for equitable sharing of 
resources in transboundary situations where it is impossible to obtain prior 
informed consent.  
Overall, the CBD seeks to empower countries to promote and 
encourage conducive conditions that not only promote research to protect 
biodiversity and thus, ensure sustainable development. The overarching 
benefit of the Guidelines and the Protocolsare that they provide clear 
options for member states to deal with such issues within their legal 
structure. In all the CBD has made great progress, either directly or through 
the protocols, to equip countries to seek specific returns to permit 
prospecting. It is up to the member states to use local legislation to clearly 
define and subject the access provision to proper consent of the 
communities by outlining clear and standardized procedures.  
a) Access to Technology: Access to biodiversity in exchange for 
access to technology captures the essence of CBD‘s vision to promote 
global equity.28 Thus, the issue of access and benefit sharing needs to be 
positioned in the light of the CBD provisions for transfer of technology.29 
Article 1 of the CBD emphasizes the need for ―fair and equitable‖ sharing 
of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.30 Similarly, Article 
15, which discusses access to genetic resources, indicates the expectation of 
transfer of technology31 whereas Article 16 details the access to technology 
commitments. 32  By incorporating the philosophy of exchange of 
technology and genetic resources, the CBD has raised the awareness level 
of the value inherent in genetic resources. However, in light of the relatively 
easy access to genetic resources, the flexibility in the narrative of the CBD 
has resulted in the issues discussed below. 
                                                          
28  Chen, supra note 19, at 10659. 
29  See Srividhya Ragavan, The Global South as the Key to Biodiversity and Biotechnology—A 
Reply to Professor Chen, 32 Envir. L. Rep. 10358, 10359–61 (2001). 
30  CBD, supra note 1, art. 1. 
31  Id. Art. 15. 
32  Id. Art. 16. 
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First, the CBD narrative, although encouraging developing 
countries to provide access to genetic resources, repeatedly conditions 
transfer of technology commitments on mutual agreement of the parties. The 
emphasis on mutual agreement subjects transfer of technology obligations 
to the bargaining skills of the parties.33 For instance, Article 15(4) specifies 
the expectation for benefit sharing between the providers and users of 
genetic material, but adds that ―such sharing shall be made on mutually 
agreed terms.‖34 Similarly, Article 16(2) specifies the transfer of technology 
will occur ―preferentially‖ under ―fair and most favorable terms.‖ 35 The 
CBD does not define the terms ―fair and most favorable‖ or ―preferential,‖ 
presumably to allow nations to effectively define them. 36  The article 
operates on the assumption that ―preferential terms‖ for transfer of 
technology will be negotiated or facilitated by members. Further, Article 
16(3) requires that countries providing genetic material be ―provided access 
to and transfer of [proprietary] technology . . . on mutually agreed terms.‖37 
Thus, the obligations of transferring technology remains dependent on the 
bargaining powers of parties, which skews the balance against nations with 
less bargaining parity. In practice, the relative bargaining power of the 
parties makes it difficult to negotiate an equitable transfer of technology. In 
some instances, the local communities that are involved may be unaware of 
the extent of development or the realm of available technologies, options 
or possibilities from the accessed materials. Developing or least-developed 
countries can hardly be expected to bargain and negotiate a meaningful 
technology transfer agreement under such circumstances. Perhaps, it is in 
recognition of this impediment that the Nagoya Protocol outlines 
mechanisms that can be used to improve bargaining exercise. For instance, 
Article 22 discusses capacity building and encourages member states to 
identify their national capacity needs and priorities through self-assessment. 
Such an exercise could greatly enhance the negotiation by informing the 
diversity holders of their needs and help them exploit their resources 
towards adding value to existing resources.  
Second, the benefit-sharing provision of the CBD does not obligate 
developed nations to impose statutory transfer requirements in exchange 
                                                          
33  Id. Art.15(2) (highlighting that access is also subject to mutually agreed terms). 
34  Id. Art.15(4). 
35  Id. Art.16(2). 
36  Id.  
37  Id. Art.16(3). 
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for benefits derived from genetic resources. For instance, Article 19 of the 
CBD states that countries shall ―take legislative, administrative or policy 
measures, as appropriate, to provide for the effective participation in 
biotechnological research activities.‖38 Article 19(2) stresses the need for 
developing countries to participate in efforts to further research and 
development.39 The local participation requirement is another form of the 
local working requirement rendered as a barrier to trade under the TRIPS 
agreement. Unlike clause 1, however, clause 2 operates only if the parties 
arrive at ―mutually agreeable‖ terms. 
Third, the CBD‘s contemplated objective is an exchange of genetic 
and technological resources ―taking into account all rights over those 
resources and to technologies.‖ The rights over biodiversity resources are 
unclear because ownership remains unresolved. The government, one or 
more indigenous societies (which need not be a cohesive group), or other 
locals can all either share or retain specific rights of ownership. 
Consequently, what amounts to effective protection of rights over 
biodiversity resources—whether it is right to royalties, sharing IP rights, or 
merely a requirement to grant ―prior informed consent‖—is left for 
individual member states to determine. The Nagoya Protocol in the Annex 
lists monetary and non-monetary benefits that can serve as a guidepost to 
member countries.  
The flexibility and the opportunity to create mutually beneficial 
agreements offered by the CBD is a great asset. Recognizing that in 
practice, there is a tendency to acquire as much of the genetic resources as 
possible with minimal transfer of technology, the Nagoya Protocol has 
attempted to address how the CBD‘s flexibilities can be best exploited. In 
all, CBD provides a great opportunity for biodiversity-rich members to 
statutorily structure access to technology requirements as a precondition for 
appropriate access.  
b) Access and IP Rights: The biggest criticism of the CBD is 
perhaps its emphasis on accommodating IP rights that will interfere with 
transfer of technology to the poorest regions of the world. For instance, 
Article 16(2) of the CBD specifies that technology subject to IP rights shall 
                                                          
38  See id., Art. 19. 
39  Id. Art.19(2) (mandating access to technology by developing countries ―on a fair and 
equitable basis‖). 
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be transferred ―on terms which recognize and are consistent with the 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.‖ 40  In 
practice, arguably there will be no access to technology under the CBD 
unless IP is adequately protected and respected by an agreement defining 
the contours of the technology. 
Further, unlike rights over resources discussed earlier, the IP regime 
clearly allocates rights over technologies. Consequently, the process of 
granting access to biodiversity recourses while accounting for the ―rights 
over the technology‖ results in positing IP rights ahead of rights over the 
biodiversity resources. Ideally, access to genetic resources should be made 
in exchange for a transfer of technology that leads toward sustainable 
development ―notwithstanding intervening IP rights.‖ This way, indigenous 
communities can, for instance, seek access to sophisticated technologies or 
patented medications in return for access to genetic resources. Although 
the language in Article 16 (5) highlights that IP rights should not run 
counter to the working of the CBD, so far very few negotiations have 
actually used Article 16(5) to ensure access by indigenous people to the 
technologies. The Nagoya Protocol has attempted to address some of these 
issues through their guidelines like laying out clear terms over ownership of 
intellectual properties, joint ownership etc. Even though the success of 
these terms unfortunately depends on bargaining parities, the increased 
awareness has resulted in conscious efforts in several countries towards 
protection of biodiversity assets. Similarly, many developing countries, 
including India, have attempted to provide different types of protection to 
prevent depletion of traditional knowledge assets.  
III. India‟s Standing in the Diversity and Trade Complex 
 India‘s standing on biodiversity issues remains important on 
account of several reasons. First, as one of the leaders of emerging 
economies and a member of the BRIC group of nations, the steps that a 
country like India takes to protect biodiversity becomes a trend setter to 
other developing countries. Second, protection of environment and its 
related assets is a Constitutional issue in India. 41  Third, India is a 
documented mega-diversity country. The National Biodiversity Authority in 
                                                          
40  See CBD, supra note 1, Art. 16(2). 
41  Constitution of India, (India) (1950), Directive Principles of State Policy, Part IV Art 
48A. 
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India accounts for 7-8% of the recorded species of the world with a 
documented 45,968 species of plants and 91,364 species of animals. 42 
Fourth, the country houses 4 of the 34 global biodiversity hotspots and is 
recognized as a Vavilovian Center for diversity of crops.43These are the 
geographic regions where crops exhibit maximum diversity in terms of 
number of races and botanical varieties.44 Fifth, India also houses several 
tribal and indigenous communities within the country and hence, 
protection of their knowledge is important. Last, notwithstanding all of the 
above, India‘s status as an emerging economy, its rate of real estate 
development, the extent of corruption and the extent of pollution has 
resulted in the depletion of biodiversity at alarming levels. Hence, efforts to 
conserve biodiversity and develop sustainably are important paradigms of 
India‘s development agenda.  
India has taken steps to preserve its biological diversity and 
associated assets. The following narrative examines some of these steps and 
its adequacy to address the problems. The narrative below examines 
whether these are adequate and if so, to what extent?  
A. BIODIVERSITY ACT, 2002 
India has embraced the mandate of conservation of biological 
diversity, sustainable use of its components and fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the use of biological resources by enacting the 
Biological Diversity Act, 2003. The statute‘s conduit to lead towards 
conservation of biological diversity and sustainable use of its components is 
to facilitate fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of 
biological resources or traditional knowledge. Consequently, the enactment 
establishes a National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) with powers to address 
the broad objectives of the enactment. For instance, the scope of the 
responsibilities of the NBA includes to ensure joint ownership with the 
knowledge holders to facilitate transfer of technology and oversee research 
and development activities with the local people.  Among other things, the 
NBA will also deal with issues of ―agro-biodiversity‖ which relates to 
                                                          
42  Policy Issues on Biodiversity (PPT), National Biodiversity Authority of India, Chennai 
(2003) available at www.nba.nic.in 
43  Id. Vavilovian Centers are areas around the world where most life originated from. 
44   K. Venkatraman, India‘s Biodiversity Act 2002 and its Role in Conservation,  Tropical 
Ecology 50(1): 23-30, 2009.  
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biological diversity of agriculture related species and their wild relatives.  
Functionally, the NBA is required to streamline access to biological 
resources by instituting an approval process. Thus, the concentration seems 
to be to ensure that no biological resource is transferred out of India 
especially by non-Indians (or non-resident Indians) or foreign corporations. 
The extensive approval process creates an oversight except in the case of 
institutional research which is exempted from the permission requirement 
provided such research falls with the scope of the Central Government 
policies. Importantly, any patent obtained using information relating to 
biodiversity is subject to benefit sharing and other comparable conditions 
like royalty sharing arrangements. 
In terms of its structure, the NBA consists of a Chairperson and 
three exofficio members one of whom will represent Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs and the other two representing the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests of whom one shall be the Additional Director General of Forests 
or the Director General of Forests. Additionally, the Central Government 
will also appoint seven other members (also termed as ex officio members) 
representing different ministries including agriculture, biotechnology, 
Ocean Development, Indian Systems of Medicine and Homeopathy, etc. 
These members will be guided by five non-official members who will serve 
as specialists with special knowledge of biological diversity. The NBA will 
also be assisted and advised by the State Biological Diversity Board (SDB) 
which is similarly structured like the NBA. In turn, local bodies can have 
biodiversity management committees which will oversee conservation and 
sustainable use issues within the area.  
B. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE BILL45 
Amidst all of this, India is also attempting to legislate a Traditional 
Knowledge Bill with the objective of protecting traditional knowledge and 
―the rights of the traditional communities to practice, use, share and sell the 
products of the use of traditional knowledge as per their customary 
practice.‖ The Bill‘s objectives include ―sustainability of resources on which 
the traditional knowledge are based, as well as to ensure the continuum of 
the customary practices of the traditional knowledge.‖ This Bill also 
establishes a governing mechanism – the Traditional Knowledge Board – 
                                                          
45  Draft Traditional Knowledge Bill, 2009, Circulated during the 2nd National 
Consultation on IPR & TK, New Delhi, July 4th and 5th 2009. 
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with zonal several offices. The more egregious portions of the Bill adds that 
this office will receive applications for access to the traditional knowledge 
in the prescribed format along with the details of the prior informed 
consent, evaluate the impact on the environmental, conduct social impact 
assessments, and oversee the traditional knowledge and resource 
management plans submitted by the accesor. Further, before approving 
access and license to use the traditional knowledge, the board will evaluate 
to determine whether the bioprospecting will affect public order and 
morality. Additionally, the Board will also facilitate the traditional 
communities to negotiate the terms and conditions of benefit sharing upon 
access to use the traditional knowledge. 
C. INDIAN PATENT OFFICE GUIDELINES ON TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE46 
With a view to further bolster legislative and regulatory protection 
in this area, the Indian patent office has also issued guidelines for the 
processing of traditional knowledge related applications.  The Guidelines 
mandate examiners to include the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library 
(TKDL) as part of its prior art search process and to ensure that any 
material taken from the database is duly accounted for. Thus, the source of 
the biological materials, a declaration as to whether that the material 
originated from India or abroad and due permission from the competent 
authority should all be appended with the application. In addition to all of 
these, separate permission is required from the NBA in order for the 
application to be prosecuted for patentability analysis. Under the 
Guidelines, the following materials would be considered patent defeating: 
a) Extracts/alkaloids and/or isolation of active ingredients of plants, 
which are naturally/inherently present in plants,  
b) Combination of one or more plants with same known-therapeutic 
effect for treating the same disease would be treated as an obvious 
combination (even if increased therapeutic efficacy is seen), 
c) Use of an ingredient known for the treatment of a disease will 
create a presumption of obviousness when any combination using 
the same active ingredient is used, and 
                                                          
46   Guidelines for Processing of Patent Applications Relating to Traditional Knowledge 
and Biological Material, Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trademarks, India (2013) available at ipindia.nic.in. 
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d) Isolation of a single component from multiple ingredients with 
known to therapeutic activity (as per traditional knowledge). 
Interestingly, that materials isolated from its natural state should not 
patented is a point vigorously argued in the United States over the dispute 
involving the Myriad gene patents issue that is currently being considered 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.47 
 
d. A NOTE ON INDIA‟S EFFORTS – WHAT A MESS! 
In gist, the various legislative framework in India that caters to this 
area of law seems over-lapping, unclear and poorly drafted. The good 
intentions to provide protection for biodiversity materials have not fully 
translated into appropriate legislative mechanisms. Instead, the over lapping 
legislative efforts seemingly covers the same issues while leaving out gaping 
loopholes.  
The Biodiversity Act widely covers sustainable development. Yet, 
the notion of ―sustainability of resources‖ is discussed under the 
Traditional Knowledge Bill and reflects the same principles. Having two 
legislations discuss the exact same components is confusing and 
unnecessary. Further, each of these legislations establishes central and state 
authorities to perform similar functions. In essence, areas where 
communities practice traditional knowledge are also areas that are rich in 
diversity. Hence, the oversight under the biodiversity statute should be 
more than sufficient without the need for duplicative efforts under the 
traditional knowledge legislation.  
With respect to traditional knowledge, several of the documents in 
India discuss ―protection.‖ And, many of the models that seem to be 
discussed are styled akin to the intellectual property style of protection. It 
seems lame that a country that objects to patent protection would jump 
towards protection of traditional knowledge using intellectual property as a 
framework. Importantly, one has to recognize the regulatory & 
implementation costs associated in creating such an IP based model 
                                                          
47  Association of Molecular Pathology, et al, v. Myriad Genetics Inc, et al, No. 12-398 
(On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
16 Indian J. Intell. Prop. L. 
 
reduces efficiency – thus, establishing such a model should be avoided at all 
costs. Arguably, these efforts do not fully appreciate the important 
differences between beneficially exploiting the resources versus creating a 
protection regime for traditional knowledge. Mere protection regime does 
not necessarily mean that there will be beneficial exploitation of resources 
unless the plan for the latter is carefully delineated.  
With respect to protection of traditional knowledge, there seems to 
be no research or on-going study on the question of underlying differences 
between the nature of the property in traditional knowledge and other 
intellectual properties. Such understanding is critical to structuring a regime 
to ensure protection for traditional knowledge by taking into account the 
important differences with the intellectual property regime.  
The over populated bureaucratic regimes that the biodiversity act 
and the traditional knowledge bill together imposes will merely increase the 
burdens which can impede realistic attempts to conserve biodiversity, or 
protect traditional knowledge materials appropriately. The amount of public 
money that would be required to fund and maintain these institutions will 
eat into finances that should rightfully belong to the traditional 
communities from benefit sharing. Further, the interaction of these two 
bureaucracies with other government institutions will create more burden 
and overly complicated mechanisms to deal with this area.  
With respect to a patent, if a patent covers part of traditional 
knowledge materials, it will be cleared by the National Biodiversity Board, 
the authorities under the traditional knowledge statue (if passed) and will 
also be subject to the oversight of the patent examiner. If India feels that 
new discoveries in Ayurveda and Herbal medicines should be subjected to 
patent protection, such overly burdensome procedures involving several 
statutory authorizes is the best way to kill it.   
The traditional knowledge bill provides for the authorities under the 
enactment to conduct ―social impact assessments‖ and evaluate whether 
the access of traditional knowledge affects public order, morality and the 
environment.‖ It is unclear how these authorities, who are typically 
administrative or service officers, will transform to perform the role of 
arbiters or specialists of morality, environment impact studies and public 
order all at the same time and without appropriate guidelines is unclear. 
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Presumably, each of these are subjects require independent specialists to 
evaluate the outcome appropriately.  
In addition to all of the above, India has also enacted a Protection 
of Plant Varieties and Farmer‘s Rights Act, 2001.48 This enactment also 
discusses benefit sharing and outlines a detailed set of statutory procedures 
relating to benefit sharing. Interestingly, this enactment also creates an 
extant variety typology which was introduced to protect traditional 
knowledge and indigenous farmers.49 The extant variety register serves as a 
compilation of matters known and existing in the public domain. In 
essence, an extant variety encompasses a farmers‘ variety, or a variety about 
which there is common knowledge, or a variety in the public domain and 
any variety notified under section 5 of the Seeds Act.50 
By making farmers‘ variety a subset of extant variety, the PPVFA 
facilitates farmers to register varieties they have cultivated for years to 
ensure that it cannot be appropriated. The most important benefit is that 
registration or compilation of extant varieties creates a higher standard for 
distinctness/non-obviousness for registering ―new‖ varieties. Thus, it 
prevents protection of miniscule innovations by breeders. The interesting 
aspect is that the Biodiversity Rules, 2004 mandates in Rule 22 that every 
local body constitute the Biodiversity Management Committee (BMC).51 
The main function of these committees is to prepare People‘s Biodiversity 
Register in consultation with local people. Such registers are conceived to 
―contain comprehensive information on availability and knowledge of local 
biological resources, their medicinal or any other use or any other 
traditional knowledge associated with them.‖52 
Interestingly, these registers perform the exact same function like 
the extant variety register, perhaps with more information. It would be 
natural for both of these registers to contain overlapping information –and, 
they would both perform the same function of creating a log of existing 
                                                          
48  The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers‘ Rights Act, No. 53 of 2001; India 
Code (2001) available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=200153. 
(Hereinafter, PPVFA).  The President of India assented to the PPVFA but the 
enactment came into force as of Jan, 2007. 
49  Id. §14(b). 
50  Id. § 2(j). 
51  Biodiversity Rules, 2004 available at nbaindia.org 
52  Id. at Rule 22(6). 
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materials. Perhaps creating one log that will record the extant varieties, 
existing traditional knowledge and biological resources would be a more 
efficient idea than having similar data spread over materials several 
statutory registers controlled by different authorities.  
Similarly, the PPVFA‘s registration regime also recognizes the role 
of local farmers and their traditional knowledge.  In doing so, the 
application requirements under this enactment (which is a sui generis regime 
for the protection of innovation in plant breeding) must include a 
denomination to the variety and describe (1) the geographical origin of the 
material and (2) all information regarding the contribution of the farmer, 
community, or organization in the development of the variety.53 Further, 
the application must state that all genetic or parental material used to 
develop the variety has been lawfully acquired.54 
Moreover, section 40 necessitates the breeder to disclose 
information ―regarding the use of genetic material conserved by any tribal 
or rural families in the breeding or development of such [new] 
variety.‖55The information in the application is meant to facilitate benefit 
sharing – which is very similar to the system described in the Biodiversity 
Act, 2002 – yet, these two mechanisms not been reconciled well. That is, 
whether there will be one benefit sharing mechanism into which all of the 
recourses generated from the various enactments will flow or whether these 
will all function as different benefit sharing systems within the scope of 
different bureaucracies set up under different statutes. This issue remains 
unclear.  
India‘s biggest problem is the depletion of valuable bio-diversity 
assets on account of urbanization. Unfortunately, this aspect is completely 
left uncovered. Thus, whether conservation efforts should include having 
adequate parks and green areas in the city has not been addressed. If so, 
that the biodiversity authorities and town planning authorities need to work 
together towards sustainable development and conservation is a concept 
that seems to be untouched in India. Instead, there is an overly egregious 
and misplaced fetish on traditional knowledge protection falling into the 
framework of several legislations. That traditional knowledge should be 
                                                          
53  Id. § 18(1)(e). 
54  Id. § 18(1)(h). 
55  PPVFA, supra noteError! Bookmark not defined., § 40. 
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protected appropriately is not denied, but, the mechanism in India is 
unfortunately, not well-thought of. 
Similarly, depletion of valuable agricultural land to real estate and 
buildings is an on-going concern in India. Amidst this, the country also 
faces woeful infrastructure making it impossible to ignore the requirements 
of building roads. Yet, these efforts have to be balanced with biodiversity 
protection as well as sustainable development – a paradigm that the 
Biodiversity Act, 2002 unfortunately, does not address. Notably, India also 
has an Environment Protection Act, which can also address some of these 
issues. Perhaps, the hype and the excitement surrounding the Biodiversity 
Act and traditional knowledge Bill has caused India to diminish the role of 
the Environment legislation.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
India‘s interest to protect traditional knowledge, beneficially prevent 
undue exploitation of such knowledge while conserving biodiversity and its 
related assets is highly commendable. But, the exercise has to be more 
thoughtful from the point of view of outcome and objectives that needs to 
be achieved. An efficient and integrated system that helps achieve the 
objectives of protection, conservation and sustainable development needs 
to be a by-product of careful research and not a piece-meal approach. 
